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Demographic, Environmental
and
Security Issues Project
DESIP

The role of demographics and resource-stress in the Kosovo conflict

By K.H. von Kaufmann

Traditional analyses of the conflict in Kosovo tend to focus on nationalistic politics while scarcity issues are given short shrift or ignored completely. The ethnic divide in Kosovo between Kosovar Serb and Kosovar Muslim was typically the most prominent feature of media reports and little if any attention was paid to the underlying causes of the inter-communal conflict that culminated in the March 1999 US led NATO air bombardment of Yugoslavia. The argument of this paper is that in Kosovo, large demographic changes, the degradation of natural resources, conflict over land-rights and unemployment caused by industrial decline played significant roles in creating the poverty and discontent that eventually led to the outbreak of hostilities.

The Background

In 1976 the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia had a per capita personal income of 86 percent of the Yugoslav average and was steadily increasing. By 1978 electricity and running water had reached all but the remotest villages. Life expectancy had risen to 68 years and 95 percent of children were receiving elementary schooling. There was 1 doctor per 2009 people compared to 1 per 8527 in 1952. This caused a rapid increase in the province's population growth rate and combined with an over-dependence on heavy industry and increasing land shortage/ degradation, Kosovo's unemployment rate went from 18.6 % in 1971 to 27.5% in 1981, 56% in 1989 and to 70% in 1995.

The Serb/Montenegrin proportion of Kosovo dropped from 50% in 1950, to 27.4 percent in 1961 to 10 percent in 1991. By 1999 there were two million people living in Kosovo, a doubling since 1960. At an annual growth rate of 2.1%, population growth exceeded economic growth and was higher than that of many developing countries. The burden of added population put a strain on the province's ability to maintain full employment and to provide sufficient funds for such vital infrastructure as schools and hospitals, etc.

The Ecological Consequences

Kosovo has a surface area of 10,887 square kilometres, much of which was more productive in the past. Kosovo’s forests have been damaged by the pressure for land and continue to be subjected to uncontrolled cutting. Thousands of hectares of woods have been cut down without being replaced. Urban waste which piled up uncontrolled has been an enormous problem for the cities (1997). Kosovo became increasingly polluted and its environment degraded since it was over dependent on mineral extraction and outdated industrial processes. For example, in 1990 the atmosphere of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo, near the smelter, (not be confused with the Mitrovica in Serbia) registered some 45,000 tons of sulphur dioxide, (which causes acid rain); 44 tons of lead; and 790 tons of other dangerous pollutants. In addition, two million tons of ash, 100,000 tons of sulphur, over 12 tons of arsenic, and 3 tons of beryllium were found. Radioactive contamination is also present in this region. It is difficult to gauge the absolute extent of the of these environmental problems, except to say that Kosovo is “significantly polluted.” The Kosovo Green movement has been vocal about these issues, but they tend to portray them as problems inflicted by the central Yugoslav government - though there are also other areas of Yugoslavia with similar industrial problems. ("Kosovo - Where victories come hard," Xheralldina Cernobregu, The Environment News Service. 8 May 1997.)

Political and Social Consequences

From 1981 onwards, discontent and anger resulting from unemployment amongst the Kosovar population and perceived or real mistreatment of increasingly marginalized Serbs led to virulent nationalist forces in both ethnic groups. Discontent led to a rise in demonstrations and riots and finally broke out into armed violence in 1995/6 and all-out war beginning in 1998.

Over the last 50 years many Serb farmers felt forced to migrate due to pressure for farmland, and the growing Albanian population. Perhaps 400,000 illegal Albanian immigrants arrived from Albanian in the years after WWII, fleeing from dictator Enver Hoxa’s repression and a lack of economic opportunity. By 1998 the proportion of Serbs had dropped to 10 percent. Currently (September 1999) there are estimated to be only 50,000 Serbs remaining in Kosovo province.

As poverty has increased in Kosovo, politicisation and polarisation has occurred in both communities. Political radicalisation created the beginnings of the KLA in the 1970's, composed largely of Marxist students and the separatist movement. Similarly the Serb community looked increasingly to nationalist politicians such as Slobodan Milosevic to allay their fears and safeguard what they perceived as their rights. Increasing violence against the shrinking Serb community in the mid-1980s led Belgrade to impose increasingly greater central control. It could be argued that greater control from Belgrade was at first largely a consequence, not a cause of the radicalisation of the two sides.

Traditional analyses correctly make much of the "jobs apartheid" i.e. the apparent favouritism of Serbs and bias against Albanians in Kosovo. However, the much greater factor of unemployment created by demographic growth generally goes unmentioned. Moreover, the ethnic divide that is the most obvious feature of the conflict is often cited as the root problem. However, absent several critical factors, two or more diverse cultures or ethnic groups can and do live in harmony for long periods of time. The diverse cultures of Yugoslavia itself lived in relative harmony, or at least without violent conflict from the end of WWII, until some years after the death of President Tito.

By 1980, at the time of Titos death, the population of Yugoslavia had grown to 23 million from just over 15 million in 1950 without a corresponding growth in GDP. It took almost a decade for the contending forces in the country to find an outlet in violent conflict. (Outside the scope of this paper is a discussion of the failure of the international community to take the steps necessary to prevent the deteriorating Yugoslav situation from escalating into war, especially in the 1989-91 period. An important catalyst in the breakup of Yugoslavia seems to have been international recognition of breakaway movements notably the European Union and especially German recognition of Croatia. However, the point may be made here that even if the proper international leadership had existed and managed to prevent the misery and destruction of war, such a course would have done nothing to address the underlying issue of population pressing against diminishing per capita resources.)

The opportunity that Tito’s death presented the contending forces may help to explain why violent conflict may break out in some cases and not in others where the social and economic disparities may be the same or greater. Even when disparity exists, and there are clearly defined and organized groups, there must be structural opportunities for changing the status quo (See Thomas Homer Dixon, “On the Threshold”, Part III, International Security, Fall 1991, Vol. 16, no 2). Similarly, ethnic divides in and of themselves are not the determining factors. They are simply the fault lines across which violence finds the path of least resistance when the opportunity is present.

Commentary

Seeing the conflict as purely political or ethnic is to see only the symptom. There is a reluctance to see such conflicts as a result of demographic expansion and natural resource limitations and overuse. One advantage of pointing to the resulting scarcity as the key factor is that a straightforward remedy is also implied. The simple (yet practically impossible to achieve) remedy is to find a way to reduce demands on resources to a sustainable level. Such an approach also suggests an investigation into how population growth leading to ever rising consumption seems a permanent feature of our political and cultural landscape.

The implications of such an analysis are stark. The Balkans are only one of many areas where underlying conditions of scarcity make for an actual or potentially explosive situation. Not only is misery and political tension increasing in many areas, but in an age of rapidly expanding weapons of mass destruction, the international ramifications of local conflicts seem to be spreading wider and wider.

Notes

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